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PARENTHESIS
CLINTON ON WMD’S
Bush’s Budget

The Bush administration released the
fiscal year 2005 budget on February 02.
Highlighting the budget was increased
funding for security and anti-terrorism,
and a confirmation of the President’s
promise to cut the budget in half within
five years. In addition, 65 programs
are to be eliminated with cuts to an
additional 63, saving a total of 4.9 billion dollars. The Education Department
alone saves 1.4 billion from the elimination of 38 programs. Maybe we could
learn something about trimming fat
from a budget here in Oregon.

Beyond the Call of Duty

The BBC has apologized to Prime
Minister Tony Blair following a government inquiry into a story it published
concerning the suicide death of Iraqi
weapons expert David Kelly, who was
identified as the source for a story
claiming the Blair had “sexed up” intelligence leading up to the war with Iraq.
Two top BBC officials have resigned,
while radicals and conspiracy theorists
continue to accuse the government of a
“whitewash.”

"When I left office, there was a substantial amount of
biological and chemical material unaccounted for. That
is, at the end of the first Gulf War, we knew what he
had. We knew what was destroyed in all the inspection
processes and that was a lot. And then we bombed with
the British for four days in 1998. We might have gotten
it all; we might have gotten half of it; we might have gotten none of it. But we didn't know. So I thought it was
prudent for the president to go to the U.N. and for the
U.N. to say you got to let these inspectors in, and this
time if you don't cooperate the penalty could be regime
change, not just continued sanctions “
-Bill Clinton, July 22, 2003

ON GENDER RELATIONS
“ [T]he Male Belief System, that compartmentalized, hierarchical, ejaculatory,
andocentric power structure that is Patriarchy, is fatal to the hearts of men, to
empathy and relationship.... That's why V-Day, The White House Project and their
many allies are partnering to hold a national women's convention somewhere
in the heartland, next June of 2004. Its purpose will be to inspire and mobilize
women and vagina-friendly men around the 2004 elections and to build a new
movement that will coalesce our energies and forces around a politic of caring....
This movement will be a volcano that will erupt in a flow of soft, hot, empathic, breathing, authentic, vagina-friendly, relational lava that will encircle
patriarchy and smother it. We will be the flood and we'll be Noah's arc. "V" for
Vagina, for vote, for victory.”
“Hanoi” Jane Fonda

US INTELLIGENCE INQUIRY
You Gonna Eat That?

A man convicted of killing another man
and eating his dismembered body has
been sentenced to eight and a half years
in prison in Germany. The court rejected
a murder charge against Armin Meiwes,
which carried a life sentence, as his
victim had allegedly agreed to be killed
and consumed. No word as to what was
eaten for dessert.

portlandspectator.com
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“ David Kay's testimony should put to rest any doubts that the Bush
administration "sexed up" intelligence or pressured analysts to reach
conclusions to fit any political agenda. Kay is unequivocal on this point,
saying "never — not in a single case — was the explanation, 'I was pressured to
do this.'" Still, dreams die hard among the Bush haters. Instead of overt pressure,
the Left is now arguing that the personal visits by Vice President Dick Cheney
and
his chief of staff Scooter Libby subliminally intimidated the intelligence
community into telling the vice president what he wanted to hear.
The critics might have a point if the Bush administration had made a case on
Iraq that was substantially different from its predecessors. But it was nearly
identical. In fact, in some ways the Clinton administration was even more
alarmist on the issue than this one has been.“
- Representative J.D. Hayworth - Arizona
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Campus Update
Drink Up, Calm Down

Rowdy bars in Portland may soon
have more to worry about than broken
bar stools and vomit on the bathroom
floor. On February 11th, The Portland
City Council is expected to vote on the
“Time, Place, and Manner” ordinance.
Under the ordinance, if a business serving alcohol generates three or more
complaints within a month, it could be
subject to restrictions on its hours of
operation, and may potentially have its
liquor license revoked.

Sympathy for the Devil

Three convicted sex offenders have been
released from detention by a federal
judge in Portland. The men were being
held while awaiting deportation under
the Operation Predator initiative aimed
at immigrant sex offenders, which was
launched nationwide in July 2003.
Opponents of the operation say it “goes
contrary to our whole system of justice.”

Calling all Republicans

Democrats hold all of Oregon’s top six
political offices. With three of them up
for re-election this year, Secretary of
State, state treasurer and attorney general, a Republican candidate has yet to
emerge to challenge any of them. Given
how our state is run, and that we are a
swing state for President Bush, a strong
Republican presence in the state legislature, as well as a strong Republican
turnout is needed in November. Where
are they?
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Student Government
ASPSU elections are approaching this March and like last year, student
government has descended into an irrelevant circus. Commandeered by
radicals, the Senate has effectively ceased to matter to anyone but special
interest groups and has no tangible accomplishments under its belt. The
executive branch has established itself as a weak and indecisive power
content to work only on directives handed down by its apparent conductor: the Oregon Student Association. And the judicial branch has failed
to establish order, choosing instead to only exacerbate the problems that
already exist. This year’s “Activist Judge” award goes to Matt “Madman”
Wallace for his shameless, unethical, blind devotion to his political motivations above all else. The only positive thing to come out of student government this year has been the Student Fee Committee. Aside from their
hard work and long hours, this body has served students by protecting
their pocketbooks from greedy special interest groups who feel entitled to
student money.

Seriously, where’s our money?
It appears that the Financial Aid Office has succeeded in a landmark scientific breakthrough. They have developed a device that can actually slow
down time. Unfortunately, it seems that the device has malfunctioned
somewhere in their office and no one can find it. It has proved to be quite
the nuisance as what was supposed to take a few weeks is now taking
months, sometimes exceeding entire terms. While we are excited about
this new breakthrough, we would also like our financial aid. Sure, government programs are slow, bloated and inefficient, but this is ridiculous.

The “V” is for vulgarity
“The Vagina Monologues” is back this month
with its dry, monochrome portrayal of human
nature. Having lost its shock value some time
ago, “The Vagina Monologues” now relies on an
almost exclusive appeal to vulgarity. It’s not so
much a political statement as it is a display of
crude, tasteless, ill-mannered performance art.
With every skit as vulgar as the next, “The Vagina
Monologues” is ultimately predictable, lacking
real humanity in the area it claims to value so
highly. Above all else, “The Vagina Monologues”
lacks honesty.
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EDITORIAL
ENRONizing OSPIRG part 3
OSPIRG has been zero-funded as they continue to insist on
their right to approximately $123,000 in student fees for a second time. They will probably end up getting the $21,000 they
received last year upon appeal. In the course of their massive
campaign to regain their previous funding level however, a few
things have become clear. First: OSPIRG is not honest with
students. Second: they have no shame. The issue has always
been regarding whether or not PSU student fees should be
funding statewide organizations when the vast majority of that
money leaves campus. This however, was a nonexistent issue
as OSPIRG campaigned last spring for their “referendum” with
slogans like “vote yes to help the hungry and homeless” and
“help save the environment.”
Even earlier this year in gathering 3,000 signatures OSPIRG
was not honest with students. They claimed that they had been
de-funded and unfairly targeted, (both of which are untrue) and
made no mention of the fact that they were asking for $123,000
in student fees, had already received $21,000, how that money
was spent, or why their funding practices were questioned in
the first place. Students who were supportive of OSPIRG being
funded had no idea they were getting that much money, and

when informed, their faces wrinkled in puzzlement: “They get
that much? They should get maybe ten thousand at the most.”
Even at their budget hearing, the students(?) they had used
to pack to room, hold signs and wear buttons were overheard
remarking “I don’t know why I’m here, someone just told me
to come.” While this kind of choreography is admirable, it did
not change the nature of their organization or the facts of their
budget request.
Presently, OSPIRG has set it sights on student government,
seeking to attain through control of student government what
it previously could not. And as interesting as it is that a 501 (c)
3 organization cannot carry on any propaganda or otherwise
attempt to influence legislation, it is even more interesting
to note that a number of OSPIRG leaders who hold office in
the organization also hold public office at PSU and have been
involved in influencing legislative outcomes all year. Before
examining their budget, maybe OSPIRG should examine the
law and its status as a non-profit organization. For next year,
students should be prepared to tell OSPIRG a third time: keep
our money on our campus.

The Debate Over Marriage
Supporters of gay marriage claim that the government
should not be concerned with the private lives of law-abiding citizens – sex and marriage between consenting adults,
they argue, has no reason to be regulated by government. The
foundation of marriage is love, and two homosexuals are just
as capable of loving each other as two heterosexuals.
On a purely emotional, abstract level this argument for gay
marriage is convincing to the American public. After all, the
gay lifestyle is increasingly becoming accepted as normal
behavior in mainstream society. Whether you believe this is
right or not, the fact is that society’s attitude toward homosexuality is something that cannot be restricted by government. Since homosexuals are just regular people, why are we
forbidding them to marry each other?
The Massachusetts Supreme Court, for one, does not believe
we should. Ever since the court ruled that a ban on gay marriage is unconstitutional, the country has been intensely
debating the implications of the ruling. Most of the arguments against gay marriage are based on religious codes of
moral sexual behavior, while the arguments in support tend
to be centered on open-minded, secular concepts of freedom.
Both sides, unfortunately, resort to emotive squabble and
avoid logic altogether.
The main argument against gay marriage – “it would degenerate an institution our civilization is based upon” – is a joke.
Divorce rates are tremendously high, adultery is the norm,
and if there is any institution that is already in moral disar-
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ray, it is marriage. Allowing homosexuals to legally marry
would not degenerate marriage. It would just make it nearly
impossible to define.
Based upon the Massachusetts ruling, a Utah man is already
contesting his state’s anti-polygamy laws. His reasoning is
identical to that of pro-gay-marriage advocates: he and his
wife, as well as the other woman he wants to marry, are all
adults who willingly want to enter into the sanctity of marriage together. It is even part of their constitutionally protected religious beliefs. What is the government’s place in controlling their personal lives if they all love each other? Most
people are opposed to polygamy, but that is because they are
biased in their personal beliefs – and individual notions of
morality have no place in the courtroom. Right?
If we recognize marriage as something other than a union
between one man and one woman, the proverbial ‘flood-gates’
will be open to lawsuits from people who want to engage in
polygamy, adult incest, and every other imaginable dispute
over the official definition of marriage. Since our society
accepts homosexuality to a large degree, but finds these other
behaviors to be reprehensible, the system of marriage will
become entangled in ambiguous legalisms, all of which rely
not on legal precedent but on the whim of what is socially
acceptable. At this point there will be only two options: either
discard marriage as a legal concept altogether, or allow the
people to define it any way they want to. No matter what that
means.
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Two Sides of the Same Coin
The political motivations behind foreign policy criticism. By Mateusz Perkowski
In the not-so-distant past, treachery. This enflamed the leftist antiU.S. involvement in the NATO war crowd, who were suddenly aghast
bombing campaign in Kosovo at the prospect of the U.S. acting as
was regarded by Republicans as a “chill- a global policeman, and accused the
ing comedy of errors that has defined our American public of being bamboozled
foreign policy,” according to Republican by a deceptive president. The irony was
representative Tom DeLay. Those on hardly noticed by anyone. The wars in
the right wing often noted with irony the former Yugoslavia and Iraq had one
that Clinton himself had desperately
avoided serving in Vietnam, but did
not seem to have similar trepidations about putting soldiers in harm’s
way.
Conservatives such as DeLay were
wary of the reasoning behind the
Kosovo campaign, dismissing the
massive Serbian ‘ethnic cleansing’
operation against Albanians as being
“falsely described as a huge humanitarian problem, when in comparison
Slobodan Milosevic Saddam Hussein
to other places, it was nothing.” The
conflict in Kosovo, like the wars in
Bosnia and Croatia, was seen as a prob- overwhelming similarity – opposition
lem in a turbulent region on the other to the military engagement was not due
side of the world in which the U.S. had to a genuine distaste for war, but by
political hostility toward the presiding
no business getting mixed up in.
Liberals were far more permissive. administration.
During the conflict in Kosovo, as well
Angry hordes of peaceniks were nowhere
as
the other peace keeping missions
to be found, and media superstars kept
in
the
former Yugoslavia, conservatives
oddly quiet. The violently disintegrating
Yugoslavia didn’t pose any threat to the lumped the war in with every other
U.S., and wasn’t even suspected of pos- gripe they had with Clinton, especially
sessing WMD, but the atrocities com- the Monica Lewinsky and Whitewater
mitted by President Slobodan Milosevic scandal, because they believed the presiseemed to justify military action. After dent to be a man of low character who
all, the U.N. indicted him on countless shamelessly pandered to the internabreaches of the Geneva Conventions and tional community. Similarly, the thoucrimes against humanity – “murder; sands of people across the U.S. who took
torture; cruel treatment … genocide and to the streets protesting the invasion of
the complicity in genocide….” America Iraq were largely driven by their hatred
of Bush’s policies on the environment,
wouldn’t put up with such a maniac.
In 2003, the situation was dramati- social issues, abortion, and his conneccally reversed. Once again, the U.S. was tion to ‘big business.’ In both cases, the
going to war in order to end a madman’s actual war seemed like little more than
brutal regime, led by a President who a pretext to attack the principles, and
had weaseled out of fighting in Vietnam. oftentimes the character, of the comThis time, however, Republicans were mander-in-chief. Unfortunately, in the
staunchly in support of campaign, and process of vilifying the man behind the
anyone who questioned the command- war, people lost sight of the real enemies
er-in-chief while American troops were of humanity – Milosevic and Hussein.
The necessity for military action against
fighting overseas was suspected of quesIraq,
as well as Kosovo, was not as
tionable patriotism, if not an all-out
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immediate as it was against Germany
during World War II. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, there is no
single country in the world that can truly
endanger the United States. Aside from
the insidious menace of terrorism, this
nation lacks a formidable enemy, and
for this reason, every war it undertakes
may seem superfluous. This incredible
military power leaves America with
an uncertain image of itself. Is the
U.S. a benevolent defender of weaker
nations or an arrogant imperialist and
exploiter?
The left wing and the right wing
try to use this ambiguity for political
polarization. Each tries to depict the
other as irrational, even self-destructive. Currently, the extreme left’s view
of the Bush administration, and of
conservatives in general, is almost
cartoonish: capitalist racists whose
ideal world is ruled by decadent corporations. The conservative portrayal of the
left – anti-American socialists willing to
hand over U.S. sovereignty to the United
Nations – is equally ridiculous. Only
demagogues like Michael Moore and
Michael Savage profit from this attitude.
Splitting the country along political lines
puts us at war against ourselves.
The arguments against intervention
in Kosovo – exaggerated problem, misleading motives, excessive cost – have
been adopted by the left. And conservatives have recognized the value of
‘nation building,’ an idea they once
derided Clinton for. Perhaps this indicates that the goals of this country are
more unified than it might appear. Rifts
between different platforms and political conflicts are necessary and wonderful consequences of a free society. But
to understand its place in the world,
and its responsibility, America cannot
let its perception get clouded by purely
partisan motivations. The opposing view
is oftentimes not far removed from one’s
own.
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Fighting for the Right to Choose
School vouchers and the liberal hypocrisy of choice.
By Adam Wilkie

S

ince taking office three years ago
Bush has frequently been the target of horrific insults alluding
to the fact that he is somehow racist
and could care less about the poor in
America. Recent actions by the Bush
administration to push school vouchers through Congress have exposed that
this argument and many of those in the
Democratic party are a complete fraud.
Public education in the United States
has been nothing short of a disaster
throughout my lifetime, and for many
years previously. Education specifically
within inner cities has been the worst,
robbing children of the tools necessary
to succeed. Schools in these communities have failed their students dramatically and someone is finally taking action
with a trial program of school vouchers.
The causes for the failure of public
schools are numerous. In addition to
teachers unions and occasional funding
issues, the main problem is, most frequently, uninterested parents. The Bush
administration has launched an all out
assault on the education disaster, and
for once schools are being held accountable for how well they educate. What
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a concept. For some strange reason
competition is believed to have an effect
on the amount of effort put forward capitalism at its finest. Monopolies consistently provide lousy products to their
consumers, and a monopoly is exactly
what public education is and has been
in this country. Working off this crazy
philosophy President Bush has begun to
hold schools accountable for their effectiveness and offer students the chance to
escape these publicly
financed failures.
President Bush’s most recent plan has
been to give vouchers to students who
attend failing schools so that they may
enroll in private schools where they will
have a chance to succeed. This idea
is particularly troubling for Democrats
since it might expose the lies they have
been telling the poor and minorities
that Republicans supposedly don’t care
about them. Virtually all of the families
affected through school vouchers would
be poor, working class, or minorities.
Liberal politicians everywhere sink
into a cold sweat with the idea that
Republicans will be successful in this
venture. The thought that Democrats

will lose their stranglehold (near 90%)
on the African American vote is frightening, and would inevitably jeopardize
their ability to ever reclaim control of
Congress or the White House. The troubling thing for Democrats is that polls
show a majority of blacks support the
idea, while the liberal politicians they
elect are stridently against it all the
while sending their children to elite private schools. The tide is slowly turning. In addition to Dianne Feinstein
(the California version of Hilary Clinton)
supporting school vouchers, the leaders
of the most troubled school system in the
country (D.C.) are also behind the idea.
Liberal opposition to school vouchers
is most shocking because they spend
at least some of their time screaming
that “women should have the right to
choose”. In these instances they are
referring to abortion, and the hypocrisy
quickly emerges. For some reason to
be able to think like a liberal you must
believe that women should have the right
to choose whether or not their child sees
a sharp pair of scissors and a vacuum but
not be able to choose what school that
child is able to attend should they avoid
portlandspectator.com The Portland Spectato
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the aforementioned procedure.
The three primary liberal arguments
against this proposal are ridiculous, and
quickly evaporate upon any credible analysis. The first argument is that it takes
money out of public schools harming them
even further. This is ridiculous since from
my experience school funding had little
to do with the quality of the education I
received. In fact, the worst school district
in the country (D.C.) spends the highest
amount per student. This argument is
further weakened by the fact that the current bill before Congress money doesn’t
even divert money out of public schools
to pay the private school tuition. In most
other programs currently underway the
funding comes from private foundations
set up specifically by Republicans to provide poor minority students with a better
education. Yet despite having even more
money per student to spend, Democrats
are still opposed. I’m beginning to think
the reason why they are so against the
issue is because it wasn’t their idea.
The second argument against school
vouchers is the argument for the separation of church and state. This argument fails on the simple fact that not all

private schools are religious. It is true
that most are, but it is in no way a requisite for participation in the program. If
school voucher programs became widespread there could potentially be numerous schools opened specifically to serve
voucher students with no religious theme
whatsoever. This argument was quickly
abandoned by the left as they realized that
it lacked any credibility.
The final argument revolves around
the success of the trial programs and the
historical performance of private schools.
Liberals like to argue that private schools
churn out better students because they
only accept exceptional students to begin
with. Trial programs have shown that
regardless of the prior ability of the student, there was dramatic improvement
after only a short time in the private
school. Low income students have the
ability to show even more improvement in
such a setting due to the “catch up” effect.
For example, B students can only improve
a single letter grade, while a D student has
a lot more ground to make up.
One beneficial side effect of a school
voucher program is that they may finally force public schools to provide the
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quality education demanded of them and
eliminate the need for a school voucher
program altogether. It is appalling that
Democrats would be against an issue that
would provide such a benefit to so many
poor and under-privileged children. I
have no doubt in my mind that Hilary
Clinton would be leading a parade of liberals to support this issue had it not been
spearheaded by George W. Bush, but Ted
“Chappaquiddick” Kennedy. It is disgusting, but not surprising, that Democrats
would put their own political ambitions
over the future of young inner city children across America.

PortlandSpectator.com
News and Commentary
Updated Daily
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By Roger Scruton

I

slam is a world religion with adherents far beyond the
lands of the Arabs. Moreover, between five and ten percent
of Arabs are Christians, and in recent times Christian Arabs
have played a disproportionate role in the revival of Arabic literature. It would therefore be a gross mistake to identify Islam
with Arabic culture, or to believe that a full understanding of
Islamic thought and politics can be obtained merely from a
study of the Middle East. At the same time, the faith, law, and
worldview of the Muslim diaspora directly derives from a text
whose meaning and emotional weight is contained within its
language, and that language is Arabic. Although there arose in
the wake of the Koran an extraordinary civilization, and a literary and artistic culture which matched those of contemporary
Europe, the principal source of Islamic cultural achievements
is the single book from which the faith began.1
A student of Muslim thought is immediately struck by how
narrowly the classical thinkers pondered the problems of political order, and how sparse and theological are their theories of
institutions. Apart from the caliphate—the office of “successor to” or “substitute for” the Prophet—no human institution
occupies such thinkers as Al-Ghazali, Ibn Taymiya, or Saif Ibn
‘Umar al-Asadi for long. Discussions of sovereignty —sultan,
mulk—tend to be exhortatory, instructions for the ruler that
will help him to guide his people in the ways of the faith.2
The Filasafa (i.e., thinkers influenced by Greek philosophy)

10

composed their intellectual agenda by synthesizing the Koran
with what they knew of Aristotle and Plato. But the result is a
peculiarly frozen vision of the art of politics as the Greeks had
expounded it.
Al-Farabi, for example, describes the philosopher-king of Plato
as the prophet, lawgiver, and imam to his community, arguing
that “the meaning of imam, philosopher, and lawgiver is one
and the same.”3 He emphasizes the distinction between reason
and revelation, as pondered by the contemporary Mu‘tazili
school of theologians, who held that reason could supplement
the revelations provided by the Prophet. And he acknowledges
the possibility of a political system based purely on reason and
directed to the earthly needs of the citizens. But the true system, he insists, is founded in revelation, and directed towards
happiness in the world to come. Ibn Sina (Avicenna) likewise
gives precedence to revelation, and his ideal state is founded
on prophecy and guided by the immutable shari‘a. The constitution of such a state is prophetically revealed, and is “our
Sunna which was sent down from heaven.”4
Law is fundamental to Islam, since the religion grew from
Muhammad’s attempt to give an abiding code of conduct to his
followers. Hence arose the four surviving schools (known as
madhahib, or sects) of jurisprudence, with their subtle devices
(hila) for discovering creative solutions within the letter
(though not always the spirit) of the law.5 These four schools
portlandspectator.com The Portland Spectator
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(Hanafi, Hanbali, Shafi and Maliki) are accepted by each
other as legitimate, but may produce conflicting judgments in
particular cases. As a result, the body of Islamic jurisprudence
(the fiqh) is now enormous. Such legal knowledge notwithstanding, discussions of the nature of law, the grounds of its
legitimacy, and the distinguishing marks of legal, as opposed
to coercive, social structures are minimal. Classical Islamic
jurisprudence, like classical Islamic philosophy, assumes that
law originates in divine command, as revealed through the
Koran and the Sunna, and as deduced by analogy (qiyas) or
consensus (ijma‘). Apart from these four sources (usul) of law,
no other source is recognized. Law, in other words, is the will
of God, and sovereignty is legitimate only insofar as it reflects
God’s will.
There is nevertheless one great
classical thinker who addressed
the realities of social order,
and the nature of the power
exerted through it, in secular
rather than theological terms:
the fourteenth-century Tunisian polymath Ibn Khaldun. His
Muqaddimah is a kind of prolegomenon to the study of history and offers a general perspective on the rise and decline of
human societies. Ibn Khaldun’s primary subject of study had
been the Bedouin societies of North Africa; but he generalized also from his knowledge of Muslim history. Societies, he
argued, are held together by a cohesive force, which he called
‘asabiya (‘asaba, to bind, ‘asab, a nerve, ligament, or sinew—
cf. the Latin religio). In tribal communities ‘asabiya is strong,
and creates resistance to outside control, to taxation, and to
government. In cities, ‘asabiya is weak or non-existent, and
society is held together by force exerted by the ruling dynasty.
But dynasties too need ‘asabiya if they are to maintain their
power. Hence, they inevitably decline, softened by the luxury of
city life, and within four generations will be conquered by outsiders who enjoy the dynamic
cohesion of the tribe.
That part of Ibn Khaldun’s
theory is still influential: Malise
Ruthven, for example, believes
that it casts light on the contemporary Muslim world, in which
‘asabiya rather than institutions remains the principal cohesive force.6 But Ibn Khaldun’s secular theory of society dwells
on pre-political unity rather than political order. His actual
political theory is far more Islamic in tone. He introduces a
distinction between two kinds of government—that founded
on religion (siyasa diniya) and that founded on reason (siyasa
‘aqliya).7 The second form of government is more political and
less theocratic, since its laws do not rest on divine authority
but on rational principles that can be understood and accepted
without the benefit of faith. But Ibn Khaldun finds himself
unable to approve of this form of politics. Secular law, he
argues, leads to a decline of ‘asabiya. Moreover the impediment (wazi‘) that constrains us to abide by the law is, in the
rational state, merely external. In the state founded on the

shari‘a this impediment is internal, operating directly on the
will of the subject. In short, the emergence of secular politics
from the prophetic community is a sign not of civilized progress but of moral decline.
In fact, Ibn Khaldun is rare among Muslim philosophers in
seeing the political as a separate form of human life, with its
own laws (qawanin siyasiya), aspirations, and procedures. His
bleak view of political order is due to his bleak view of the city
generally. Without the pre-political ‘asabiya, cities inevitably
decay. Ibn Khaldun’s underlying purpose was to distinguish the
caliphate (khilafa), which had persisted during the reign of the
four “righteous” caliphs, from the worldly sovereignty (mulk)
that had gradually replaced it.
Only the caliphate had either
the right or the power to survive
the collapse of earthly dynasties,
and Muslims must work constantly to restore it as the rule of
God on earth.
For all his subtlety, therefore,
Ibn Khaldun ends by endorsing the traditional, static idea of government according to the
shari‘a. In short, the Muslim conception of law as holy law,
pointing the unique way to salvation, and applying to every
area of human life, involves a confiscation of the political.
Those matters which, in Western societies, are resolved by
negotiation, compromise, and the laborious work of offices and
committees, are the object of eternal decrees, either laid down
explicitly in the holy book, or discerned there by some religious
leader—whose authority, however, can always be questioned
by a rival imam or jurist, since the shari‘a recognizes no office
or institution as endowed with any independent lawmaking
power.
Three features of the original message embodied in the Koran
have proved decisive for Muslim political thought. First, the
Messenger of God was presented with the problem of organizing and leading an autonomous
community of followers. Unlike
Jesus, he was not a religious
visionary operating under an
all-embracing imperial law, but
a political leader, inspired by
a revelation of God’s purpose
and determined to assert that purpose against the surrounding
world of tribal government and pagan superstition.
Second, the Suras of the Koran make no distinction between
the public and the private spheres: what is commanded to
the believers is commanded in response to the many problems, great and small, that emerged during the course of
Muhammad’s political mission. Laws governing marriage,
property, usury, and commerce occur side-by-side with rules
of domestic ritual, good manners, and personal hygiene. The
conduct of war and the treatment of criminals are dealt with
in the same tone of voice as diet and defecation. The whole
life of the community is set out in a disordered, but ultimately
consistent, set of absolutes. And it is impossible to judge from
the text itself whether any of these laws is more important,

“In short, the emergence of secular
politics from the prophetic community is a sign not of civilized progress but of moral decline.”

“The Muslim conception of law as
holy law ... involves a confiscation
of the political.”
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hat would it take for you to support a war? In presenting their case to the American public and the international community, the White House willfully ignored
CIA intelligence that told them Saddam did not pose any sort
of imminent threat; that would have been unacceptable to their
audience. The first justification for war was Saddam’s terror
links. Six months after Bush’s ‘Mission Accomplished’ speech,
no legitimate connection has been found between Al Qaeda
and Iraq, even if Bush wants us to believe it: “we need to think
about Saddam Hussein using Al Qaeda to do his dirty work,
to not leave fingerprints behind” Saddam is an evil person by
any standard, but he had nothing to do with 9/11, regardless
of what a high percentage of Fox News viewers believe. That’s
okay: After the initial fervor, Bush gave up on terrorism as the
justification, citing weapons of mass destruction instead. Paul
Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense, made this clear with
this statement he gave to the Washington Post:
“For bureaucratic reasons, we settled on one issue, weapons
of mass destruction (as justification for invading Iraq) because
it was the one reason everyone could agree on”
Agreed, no weapons turned up. Bush, in one of the last voluntary remarks on WMD he made (in May), before sweeping
them under the rug, said “We’ll find them. It’ll be a matter
of time to do so” Bush, at least, is clear unlike the finite time
we gave the UN, we merely have to wait an indefinite period
before we can find these alleged stockpiles. Rumsfeld’s comments are less consistently on message:
“We know where they are. They're in the area around Tikrit
and Baghdad and east, west, south and north somewhat.”
Sounded good, and those in opposition to the war hoped he’d
be right, but Rumsfeld ditched his mystery reports and optimism two months later:
“We never believed that we'd just stumble over weapons of
mass destruction in that country”
With the Al Qaeda link defunct and WMD postponed, the
Bush administration had to start putting more emphasis on
Saddam’s character to make this a moral move. But at the same
time as losing Saddam, many Iraqis lost employment, adequate food, and basic
utilities, and are still
without these things.
Virtually all experts on
the region predicted
no real government or
infrastructure could
rise without a massive
infusion of both cash
and military manpower, yet Bush steamed
ahead. If we hadn’t
struck, the first $87
billion Bush asked for
could have given full
four-year scholarships
to 1.6 million undergrads, or the fiscal
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conservative could have simply shrunk the largest deficit we’ve
had in ten years.
Saddam was an unfathomably horrible dictator, but greater
atrocities are happening in the Congo and North Korea, and
North Korea is playing with ‘nucular’ weapons. By choosing
to attack Iraq at this time, Bush stretched our troops further
than they have been at any time since Vietnam. If we are faced
with another major military engagement at the moment, like
an attack by the real terrorists, the ones who flew planes into
the World Trade Center, there is a good chance we will not be
able to act decisively: we’ve crippled our ability to fight what
we rallied for. While we administer Iraq, the Taliban and Al
Qaeda are running around relatively freely in Afghanistan.
Because of Bushís hubris, weíve created an environment in
both Afghanistan and Iraq where young men may grow up
with the willingness to sacrifice their lives in order to slaughter
innocent Americans.
Since the war has ended we have left ourselves militarily
weaker than we’ve been since the debacle of Vietnam, we’ve
given tens of billions of dollars to Halliburton, we’ve alienated
most of the Muslim world, we’ve contributed to the destabilization of an entire region, and we’ve had over five hundred of our
soldiers die. We have not found weapons of mass destruction,
significantly improved the lives of Iraqis, made clear a connection between Saddam and 9/11, or dealt with the perpetrators
of those horrible acts, and the
neither the administration nor
the conservative pundits have
justified the war.

War in
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he most serious problem with anti-war criticism is that it
reeks of political opportunism. If everything goes wrong
for America in Iraq, Democrats win big. Their subsequent tone on the issue then, is not surprising.
The three main reasons for the war in Iraq: weapons of
mass destruction, ties to terrorism, and the morally despicable
nature of Saddam Hussein’s regime. Of these three, the issue
of weapons of mass destruction is the most commonly distorted
and misrepresented.
The link to terror is clear as we have encountered, killed or
captured numerous Al-Qaeda in Iraq. The “resistance” is not
so much an Iraqi resistance as it is a resistance of foreign fighters drawn to Iraq by the U.S. presence there. So while U.S.
presence in Iraq has had a positive effect on Libyan dictator
Mouammar Khadafi, and the student movement in neighboring Iran it has also acted as a magnet, making Iraq a critical
forefront in the war on terror.
The morally despicable nature of Saddam’s regime
is also beyond contestation. Opponents of the war point to a
temporary absence of water and electricity in some areas as
we continue to discover mass graves, torture chambers, rape
rooms, and piles of decaying human remains. To hear their
version of it, Iraqis would have been better off under Saddam.
This is how far they will go. They need to downplay the atrocities of a genocidal madman for political gain.
The issue of weapons of mass
destruction therefore, is the primary target of choice for anti-war
critics. First, it must be remembered that it was never up to us
to find weapons of mass destruction. In signing U.N. resolution
1441, Saddam admitted
to possessing weapons
of mass destruction and
committed to disarm.
As Robert Kagan and
William Kristol have
pointed out, “Here is

n Iraq
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what was known by 1998 based
on
Iraq's own admissions:
* That in the years immediately prior to the first Gulf War,
Iraq produced at least 3.9 tons of VX, a deadly nerve gas, and
acquired 805 tons of precursor ingredients for the production
of more VX.
* That Iraq had produced or imported some 4,000 tons of
ingredients to produce other types of poison gas.
* That Iraq had produced 8,500 liters of anthrax.
* That Iraq had produced 500 bombs fitted with parachutes for
the purpose of delivering poison gas or germ payloads.
* That Iraq had produced 550 artillery shells filled with mustard gas.
* That Iraq had produced or imported 107,500 casings for
chemical weapons.
* That Iraq had produced at least 157 aerial bombs filled with
germ agents.
* That Iraq had produced 25 missile warheads containing germ
agents (anthrax, aflatoxin, and botulinum).
Again, this list of weapons of mass destruction is not what the
Iraqi government was suspected of producing. (That would be a
longer list, including an Iraqi nuclear program that the German
intelligence service had concluded in 2001 might produce a
bomb within three years.) It was what the Iraqis admitted
producing. And it is this list of weapons--not any CIA analysis
under either the Clinton or Bush administrations--that has
been at the heart of the Iraq crisis.”
The expectation for inspectors to go to Iraq and find weapons
of mass destruction is ridiculous. You don’t send 100 guys into
a desert the size of California and say “start looking.” There
are any number of things that Saddam could have done to the
weapons we knew and he admitted he had. He could have hidden them, destroyed them, or transported them out of country.
It was up to Saddam to cooperate and disarm, which he clearly
made a mockery of doing. And let us not forget that this man
rode his regime down in flames before fully cooperating with
the United Nations. Given the context of the war on terror,
the information available, and Saddam’s covert, uncooperative
stance, any Commander-In-Chief that would not have taken
us to war in Iraq
would not have
been doing his
duty as President
to protect and
defend the United
States of America.
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more threatening, or more dear to God’s heart than the others. the idea—vital to the history of Western constitutional governThe opportunity never arises, for the student of the Koran, to ment—of an office that works for the benefit of the community,
distinguish those matters which are open to political nego- regardless of the virtues and vices of the one who fills it.
tiation from those which are absolute duties to God. In effect,
The reader of the Koran will be struck by the radical change
everything is owed to God, with the consequence that nothing of tone that the revelations exhibit after the Prophet has been
is owed to Caesar.
forced into exile at Medina. The early Meccan Suras are short,
Third, the social vision of the Koran is shaped through intensely lyrical, and written in a free rhyming prose that
and through by the tribal order and commercial dealings of echoes the style of the pagan poets of Muhammad’s Arabia.
Muhammad’s Arabia. It is a vision of people bound to each They invoke the natural world and the wonderful signs of its
other by family ties and tribal loyalties, but answerable for Creator, being hymns of praise to the single omnipotent God
their actions to God alone. No mention is made of institutions, who speaks directly to his worshippers. They are the great
corporations, societies, or procedures with any independent dawn-vision of an impassioned monotheist, from whose soul
authority. Life, as portrayed in the Koran, is a stark, unme- oppressive shadows are being chased away.
diated confrontation between the individual and his God, in
The Medina Suras are much longer and often cantankerous.
which the threat of punishment and the hope of reward are They deal with the trials and tribulations of leadership, and
never far from the thoughts of either party.
the revelations are often granted as concrete responses to the
Therefore, although the Koran is the record of a political problems of communal life. Muhammad’s project is revealed
project, it lays no foundations for an impersonal
at every step, and it is a remarkable one: to
political order, but vests all power and authority
replace the tribal society and its pagan gods with
in the Messenger of God. There are no provia new, universal order—the Islamic umma—
sions for the Messenger’s successor, or even for
founded on belief in the one true God and on
a priesthood. The office of imam—the one who
the acceptance of his commands. To achieve this
“stands in front,” i.e., who leads the community
result Muhammad had to persuade his followers
in prayer—was assumed by Muhammad until
that he was God’s messenger; he had also to give
the day when illness prevented him from perproof of God’s favor by success in war.
forming it and he asked his father-in-law Abu
Although the community at Medina had escaped
Bakr to perform the office in his stead.
from its persecutors, it retained a powerful sense
It is still true that an imam has no institutional
of belonging elsewhere. They were al-muhajirauthority in the Sunni tradition and is merely
oun, the ones in emigration or exile (hijrah),
a man whose personal qualities and religious
and the experience of exile is invoked again and
knowledge fit him for the role. The title of Imam
again in the Islamic revivals of our times. The
is reserved by the Shi‘ites for Muhammad’s first
absolute tone of command of the Medina Suras
Ibn Khaldun
cousin ‘Ali and his descendants, who are regardtherefore goes hand-in-hand with an intense
ed as the true successors of the Prophet. But
nostalgia, and it is not surprising that the idea
even in the Shi‘ite tradition, there is no conception of a priestly of pilgrimage to the distant home should have rooted itself in
office that confers authority on the one who holds it: authority Muhammad’s mind to become one “pillar” (rukn) among the
is bestowed directly by the power of God. This point is made five that constitute the core duties of the Muslim.
further evident by the fact that, according to the Shi‘ites, the
I mention this point because it helps to explain how alien the
line of imams ceased after the twelfth, who is the still living Koranic vision of society is to any idea of territorial jurisdic“hidden” imam, destined to reappear in the last days as the tion or national loyalty. In the eyes of the Koran, the place
mahdi or “Director,” and who, according to the Koran, will where we are is not the place where we belong, since the place
announce the Day of Judgment. Hence, no living cleric can act where we belong is in the wrong hands. Our law therefore
with any greater authority than that conferred by his own per- does not issue from our present place of abode, and gives spesonal qualities in the eyes of God—unless he can show himself cial privileges only to the other place, which may one day be
actually to be the hidden imam, revealed at last after centuries reconquered. This attitude greatly favors the notion of law as
of divine displeasure, a feat which the Ayatollah Khomeini set a relation between each person and God, with no special referout to accomplish, but with only transient success.
ence to territory, sovereignty, or worldly obedience. Although
The office of caliph began as an attempt to recapture a van- localities are of enormous importance in the Muslim worldished personal authority. Hence, caliphs repeatedly failed view it is not because they are the sources of law but because
to give proof of their legitimacy, and the first three of them they are the object of law, declared holy by God in his dealings
began a lengthy tradition of dying at the hands of assassins. with mankind. A holy place is precisely one subsumed into
Those who rule in the Prophet’s name seldom satisfy their the divine order of things, rather than the seat, like Rome or
subjects that they are entitled to do so, since the authority that Paris, of a territorial jurisdiction. This is of great significance
is looked for in an Islamic ruler is—to use Weber’s idiom—a in the current conflict over Jerusalem, which for the Muslim
charismatic rather than a legal-rational form. Islamic reviv- is a place set apart from its earthly surroundings just as Mecca
als almost always begin from a sense of the corruption and is set apart, scarcely belonging to the geography of the actual
godlessness of the ruling power, and a desire to rediscover the world but existing in the numinous region of divine imperaholy leader who will restore the pure way of life laid down by tives.
the Prophet. There seems to be no room in Islamic thinking for
After the initial turmoils—in which the conflict between
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two of the righteous caliphs, ‘Uthman and ‘Ali, led to the split
Second, the way of life that grows under the aegis of the shari‘a
between Sunni and Shi‘ite—the Muslim dynasties gained ter- is profoundly domestic, without any public or ceremonial charritory by conquest. The caliphate emerged as a genuine insti- acter except in the matter of communal worship. The mosque
tution, though one increasingly deprived of political power. and its school or madrasah, together with the souq or bazaar,
Nevertheless, the experience of settled government led to seri- are the only genuine public spaces in traditional Muslim towns.
ous attempts by learned men to adapt the faith to the needs of The street is a lane among private houses, which lie along it and
government. This was the great period of the hadiths—tradi- across it in a disorderly jumble of inward-turning courtyards.
tions, authenticated by pious examination, which recorded The Muslim city is a creation of the shari‘a—a hive of private
such words and deeds of the Prophet as might offer guidance to spaces, built cell on cell. Above its rooftops the minarets point
a settled community. These hadiths are markedly more peace- to God like outstretched fingers, resounding with the voice of
ful and conciliatory than the Medina Suras, and have clearly the muezzin as he calls the faithful to prayer.
been shaped by the experience of a society in which charismatI mention these two features because they are often overic leadership is no longer the norm. They are an attempt to read looked, despite their enormous importance in the psycholback into the prophetic source of Islam the real achievements ogy and the politics of the Islamic world. The Muslim city is
of Islamic forms of government. At the same time there arose explicitly a city for Muslims, a place of congregation in which
the four schools of fiqh, which bring together the reflections individuals and their families live side-by-side in obedience
of jurists over generations, and show the attempt by ijtihad to to God, and where non-Muslims exist only on sufferance. The
establish a genuine rule of law in places where
mosque is the link to God, and the pious believe
law is nevertheless seen as issuing placelessly
that no building should overtop the minarets.
and timelessly from the will of God.
Many a Muslim carries this image in his heart,
Even in that great period of jurisprudence, howand when he encounters the Western city, with
ever, the shari‘a remained defective in the cruits open spaces, its wide streets, its visible intecial matter of legal personality. As Ruthven has
riors, its skyscrapers dwarfing the few religious
pointed out, there is no provision in Islamic law
buildings, he is apt to feel both wonder and rage
for the corporation as a legal person, with rights
at the God-defying arrogance that has so comand duties of its own.8 The city, the commitpletely eclipsed the life of piety and prayer. It is
tee, the mosque itself, do not occur as indepennot merely of anecdotal significance that, when
dent subjects of the law, and although Muslim
the terrorist leader Mohammed Atta left his
countries abound in charitable foundations—the
native Egypt for Hamburg to continue his studawqaf (singular waqf)— they are conceived not
ies in architecture, it was not to learn about the
as property in the hands of a corporate person,
modernist buildings that disfigure German citbut as property that has been simply “removed” Ayatollah Khomeini
ies, but to write a thesis on the restoration of the
from circulation or which has “ceased” (waqafa).
ancient city of Aleppo.12 When he led the attack
In Ruthven’s words, there was no “juridical definition of the against the World Trade Center, Atta was assaulting a symbol
public sphere” in classical Islamic jurisprudence,9 a fact which of economic, aesthetic, and spiritual paganism.
greatly impeded the formation of a genuine political order.
Those who see religion simply as a set of doctrines concernHence “stealing from the public treasury was not held subject ing the origin of the world, the laws that govern it, and the
to the hadd [i.e., the divinely ordained punishment for theft], destiny of mankind will think of faith merely as a substitute for
because the illegal act was not committed against a juristic rational argument, destined to crumble before the advance of
agent independent of the thief who was, along with every other science or to persist, if at all, as a jumble of tattered superstiMuslim, considered part-owner of the mal Allah, and thus tions in the midst of a world that refutes them. But doctrine
part-owner of what he had stolen.”10
is the least important part of religion, as Muhammad came
Two momentous consequences follow from the adoption of quickly to see. Communities are not formed by doctrine, but
the shari‘a. First, because it is a law governing only Muslims, by obedience, and the two great instruments for securing obethe shari‘a leaves the status of other communities undefined. dience are ritual and law. The Muslim faith involves constant
These other communities remain strictly “outside the law,” and rehearsal of the believer’s submission to God. The repetition of
must either convert or accept the status of dhimma—which sacred words and formulae, the exact performance of gestures
means protected by treaty or covenant. Only “people of the whose only explanation is that they have been commanded, the
book”—i.e., Jews, Christians, and (in Persia) Zoroastrians obligatory times of prayer, the annual fast and all the duties
—have traditionally been accorded this status. Dhimma is required by it, the dietary laws, the pilgrimage to Mecca with
offered in return for the payment of taxes, and grants no clear its myriad obligatory actions—all this, which is meaningless
and justiciable rights apart from a general right of protec- to the skeptical outsider, is the stuff of consolation.13 Ritual
tion.11 Although free communities of Christians and Jews places individuals on a plane of absolute equality; it overcomes
often thrived under Islamic law, there was no formal or legal distance, extinguishes the self in the flow of collective emotion,
acceptance of their right to worship in their own manner, and and refreshes the worshipper with a sense that he has regained
their property was subject to confiscation on more or less favor in God’s sight and hence his place in the community of
arbitrary grounds. The Turkish millet system rectified this, but believers. Ritual is a discipline of the body that conveys and
depended for its authority on the secular rule of the sultan and reinforces a discipline of the soul. It is the outward manifestahad no authority in the shari‘a.
tion of the collective act of submission (islam) that unites the
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community of believers. And it is one undeniable source of the
peace and gentleness of the old Muslim city.
In short, Islam offers an unparalleled form of membership,
and one whose appeal is all the greater in that it transcends
time and place, joining the believer to a universal umma whose
only sovereign is God. Even if it may appear, to the skeptical
modernist, as a medieval fossil, Islam has an unrivalled ability to compensate for what is lacking in modern experience. It
rationalizes and validates the condition of exile: the condition
in which we all find ourselves, severed by the hectic motion of
mechanized life from the archaic need
for membership. Nothing evokes this
more clearly than the collective rite in
which the faithful turn to Mecca with
their prayers—projecting their submission and their longing away from the
place where they are to that other and
holy place where they are not, and whose contours are defined
not by geography but by religious need.
Islam, in other words, is less a theological doctrine than a
system of piety. To submit to it is to discover the rules for an
untroubled life and an easy conscience. Moreover, rooted in
the ritual and taking constant nourishment from it is a system
of morality that clarifies those matters which must be clarified if people are to live with each
other in peace. It is a system that
safeguards the family as the primary
object of loyalty and trust; that clarifies and disciplines sexual conduct;
that sanctifies ordinary obligations
of friendship and kinship; and that
lays down rules for business which
have a power to exonerate as well
as to blame. Even if this morality,
like the rituals that feed it, threatens
those freedoms which Westerners
take for granted and which the rising
generation of Muslim immigrants
wish to exploit, it has the singular
advantage of clarity. It tells the faithful what they must do in order to be
on good terms with God; and what
they must do is entirely a matter of
private life, ritual, and worship. The
public sphere can be left to look after
itself.14
In the context of Western anomie and self-indulgence, therefore,
Muslim immigrants cling to their faith, seeing it as something
superior to the surrounding moral chaos, and therefore more
worthy of obedience than the secular law which permits so
much sin. Their children may rebel for a while against the
strict sexual codes and patriarchal absolutes of the Muslim
family; but they too, in any crisis, are drawn to their ancestral
faith, which offers a vision of moral security they find nowhere
in the public space that Western political systems have devoted
themselves to generating.
The writ of holy law runs through all things, but this does not
mean that Islamic societies have been governed solely by the
shari‘a. On the contrary, in almost all respects relevant to the

government of a large society, the shari‘a is radically deficient.
It has therefore been necessary in every epoch for the ruler
to lay down laws of his own which will guarantee his power,
facilitate administration, and permit the collection of taxes.
But these laws have no independent legitimacy in the eyes of
those compelled to obey them. They do not create a space outside religion in which freedom is the norm. On the contrary,
they merely add to the constraints of the holy law the rules of
a political order which is backed by no de jure authority, only
by de facto power. In any upheaval they are rejected entirely
as the arbitrary edicts of a usurper.
Hence, there is no scope in a traditional Islamic society for the kinds of
purely political development, through
the patient building of institutions and
secular laws, that we know in the West.
Change, when it comes, takes the form
of a crisis, as power is challenged from below in the name of
the one true Power above.
If the only way in which a law can be legitimated is by deriving it from a command of God, then clearly all secular laws are
seen as mere expedients adopted by the ruler. In such circumstances it is unlikely that any kind of constitutional, representative, or democratic government will emerge. Although the
Ottoman Empire attempted reforms
that would give legitimacy to its centralized administration, these reforms
—which led first to the destruction of
the Empire, and then to the emergence of the modern Turkish state
under Mustafah Kemal Atatürk—were
explicitly “Westernizing,” involving
both a deliberate move away from
Islamic ideas of legitimacy, and a
ruthless secularization of society,
with the ‘ulama’ losing whatever
power they had once possessed in the
educational, legal, and administrative
process.
The Westernizing of Turkey was
made possible by its imperial history, which had imposed the obligation to govern distant provinces and
recalcitrant tribes by a system of law
which could only here and there be
justified by some divine genealogy,
and which was therefore constantly
seeking legitimacy of another kind.
By remaking Turkey as a territorial rather than an imperial
power, and by simultaneously secularizing and Turkifying the
Ottoman culture, Atatürk created a national loyalty, a territorial jurisdiction, and a form of constitutional government. As a
consequence, Turkey has been the only durable democracy in
the Muslim world—although a democracy maintained as such
by frequent interventions by an army loyal to the Kemalist
project. This transition has not been without cost, however.
Modern Turkey has been effectively severed from its past. In
the ensuing search for a modern identity, young people are
repeatedly attracted to radical and destabilizing ideologies,
both Islamist and utopian.

“Islam, in other words, is
less a theological doctrine
than a system of piety.”

“...these [secular] laws have
no independent legitimacy in
the eyes of those compelled
to obey them. They do not
create a space outside religion in which freedom is the
norm. On the contrary, they
merely add to the constraints
of the holy law the rules of
a political order which is
backed by no de jure authority, only by de facto power.”
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This search for identity takes another but related form in
the Arabic-speaking countries, and the al-Qa‘eda organization should be understood as one significant result of it.15
Of course, terrorism of the al- Qa‘eda kind is an abnormality,
repudiated by the majority of Muslims. It would be the greatest
injustice to confuse Islam, as a pious way of life, with contemporary Islamism, which is an example of what Burke, writing
of the French Revolutionaries, called an “armed doctrine”—a
belligerent ideology bent on eradicating all opposition to its
claims. Nevertheless, Islamism is not an accidental product of
the crisis that Islam is currently
undergoing, and the fundamental
tenets of the faith must be borne
in mind by those who wish to
understand the terrorist movements.16
Al-Qa‘eda is the personal creation of Osama bin Laden, but
it derives from three pre-existing sociopolitical forces: the
Wahhabite movement in Saudi
Arabia; the Muslim Brotherhood
that emerged in modern Egypt;
and, finally, the technological
education now available to disaffected Muslims throughout
the Middle East.
The Wahhabite movement has its roots in the sect (madhhab)
founded by Ahmad ibn Hanbal (780–855), whose collection of
30,000 hadiths formed the basis of the Hanbali fiqh. The leading principle of Hanbali jurisprudence is that law should not
be formalized in rules or maxims but constantly derived afresh
from the original sources by an effort of ijtihad that renews
both the faith and the understanding of the judge. Hence,
Muslims must be constantly returned to the Koran and the
words of the Prophet, the authority of which cannot be overridden by political decrees or formal
legal systems. Although Hanbalism
has always been recognized as a legitimate school of fiqh, its uncompromising emphasis on the origins of the
Muslim faith has made it a permanent
source of opposition to the established
powers in Muslim countries.
Hence, when Muhammad ibn ‘Abd
al- Wahhab (1691–1765), a native of
central Arabia, sought to restore the
true faith to the Prophet’s sacred territory, he expressed himself in Hanbali terms. The aim was to return from the corrupt
practices that flourished under the Ottoman Empire and its
factititous rules and offices to the original teachings of the
Prophet and his Companions. Compelled to seek asylum in
Deraiah, al-Wahhab attracted the local chieftain, Muhammad
ibn Sa‘ud, to his cause. And it was Ibn Sa‘ud’s grandson who,
with a fanatical and puritanical following, “liberated” Mecca
from the idolatrous practices that had rooted themselves there,
establishing at the same time a short-lived kingdom in Arabia,
and thereafter paying for his presumption with his life.
Despite this political failure, Wahhabism took root in the
Arabian peninsula. The Wahhabis preached purity of lifestyle
and absolute obedience to the Koran, free from all compro-

mise with the dar al-harb. They rejected the official schools
of fiqh, including the Hanbali madhhab that had inspired
their founder, and argued that whoever can read the Koran
can judge for himself in matters of doctrine. After the death
of the Companions, therefore, no new consensus (ijma‘) could
be admitted.
In the early twentieth century a group of Wahhabis gathered
around a descendent of the original Ibn Sa‘ud to form a brotherhood (ikhwan) dedicated to the re-establishment of a purified faith by jihad. Starting out with a handful of followers in
1902, ibn Sa‘ud, as the world now
knows him, gradually drove the
Turkish clients from their paper
thrones in the Arabian peninsula.
By the time that the Ottoman
Empire collapsed, ibn Sa‘ud was
able to declare a kingdom of
Saudi Arabia in the peninsula,
and for a brief while the ikhwan
exerted their influence over the
holy places, causing widespread
alarm in the region. However Ibn
Sa‘ud, now a player on the stage
of international politics, came to
see that he must negotiate with the British for the secure possession of his kingdom, and that the suppression of his following would be a necessary price.
Although the ikhwan were brought to heel, many of them
through absorption into the Saudi National Guard, they did
not forget their original intention, which was to engage in a
jihad against the infidel. Nor did they forget that this aim had
been diverted in the interests of a secular power. Instead of
returning the sacred places to God, they had handed them over
to an earthly sovereign, and one who had the impertinence,
moreover, to name this holy territory for himself. It has never
been forgotten by the puritan ‘ulama’
of Saudi Arabia, therefore, that the
spiritual legacy of Wahhabism has
been betrayed by the family that purported to fight for it.
The other important Islamic movement in the formation of al-Qa‘eda
was also an ikhwan. The Muslim
Brotherhood was founded in Egypt
in 1928 by Hassan al- Banna, then
a twenty-two-year-old elementary
school teacher in Ismailia, a featureless new town controlled
by the Franco-British Suez Canal Company. Surrounded on all
sides by the signs and symbols of the infidel way of life, living
under a jurisdiction that had lost authority in Muslim eyes
and which stood idly by as the Muslim way of life decayed,
al-Banna, who had received a rigorous Islamic education and
had already acquired a reputation for piety, responded to
the appeals of his contemporaries to found a movement that
would bring faith, hope, and charity to the rural migrants who
were crowding into the shanty towns around the cities. For
al-Banna, however, charity was an insufficient proof of faith:
a jihad was also needed, which would expel the infidel from
Muslim soil. Islamic clubs and discussion groups abounded
in the Egypt of the time, but the Brotherhood was to be dif-

“Despite ... political failure,
Wahhabism took root in the
Arabian peninsula. The Wahhabis
preached purity of lifestyle and
absolude obedience to the Koran,
free from all compromise with the
dar al harb.”

“it has never been forgotten... that the spiritual legacy
of Wahhabism has been
betrayed by the family that
purported to fight for it.”
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ferent—a return to the militant Islam of the Prophet, the goal
of which would be to re-establish the reign of purity and piety
that the Prophet had created in Medina.
Hassan al-Banna was profoundly influenced by the Wahhabite
movement. The conquest of the Holy Places was a triumphant
proof of what could be achieved by faith, ‘asabiya, and violence. Within a decade the Brotherhood had become the best
organized indigenous political force in Egypt. Its anti-British
sentiment caused it to look to the Axis powers in World War
II, hoping for the liberation of Egypt and its own seizure of
power thereafter. After the Allied victory, it confined itself to
a campaign of terrorism, through which
to “bear witness” to Islamic truth against
the infidel.
This campaign was to provide the model
for future Islamist movements in Iran
and Lebanon. Cinemas were blown up,
along with the haunts of the “infidels and
heretics,” while women wearing “inadequate dress” were attacked with knives.
Prominent public figures were tried by the Brotherhood in
absentia and found guilty of “causing corruption on earth”:
their deaths followed as a matter of course. Two prime ministers and many other officials were murdered in this way. Young
Muslims from elsewhere in the Middle East were recruited to
the Brotherhood, which operated in secret, al-Banna denying
all involvement in terrorism until his arrest and execution in
1949. By this time the Brotherhood had trained over a hundred
terrorists from other Islamic countries, who traveled to their
homelands to initiate the same kind of destabilizing mayhem
that had brought chaos to Egypt. This unrest facilitated the
army coup which led to the destruction of Egypt’s fragile monarchy and the assumption of power by Gamal Abdul-Nasir (or
Nasser, as he is generally known in the West).
The Muslim Brotherhood was outlawed and savagely repressed
by Nasser. But it lived on as a secret
society, proliferating through cells
formed to study the letters sent
from prison by its new leading
personality, Sayyed Qutb (1906–
66), who had lived in the United
States from 1949 until 1951, and
who preached the impossibility of
compromise between Islam and
the world of ignorance (jahiliyya).
Qutb was a selfconscious intellectual in the Western sense, who attempted to give Islam a
decidedly modernist, even “existentialist” character. The faith
of the true Muslim was, for Qutb, an expression of his innermost being against the inauthentic otherness of the surrounding world.17 Islam was therefore the answer to the rootlessness
and comfortlessness of modernity, and Qutb did not stop short
of endorsing both suicide and terrorism as instruments in the
self-affirmation of the believer against the jahiliyya. In place of
the credo quia absurdum of Tertullian he preached the facio
quia absurdum (I do it because it is absurd) of the existentialist, believing that this absurdity would also be a triumph of the
spirit over the surrounding pagan culture.
Qutb and hundreds of his followers were executed by Nasser

in 1966, but not before their message had spread through
a younger generation that was enjoying for the first time a
Western-style university education and the excitement of global communications. Although Sadat and his successor, HosniMubarak, have tried to accommodate the Brotherhood by
permitting it to reorganize as a political party, with a share in
power accorded to its official leaders, the real movement continued independently, not as a form of politics, but as a form of
membership, whose “brothers” would one day be martyrs.
Many of the ideological leaders of the Egyptian Islamist movement have been, like Mohammed Atta, graduates in technical
or scientific subjects. Some have had the
benefit of postgraduate study in the West.
Their scientific training opens to them
the secrets of Western technology while
at the same time revealing the emptiness
of a civilization in which only technology seems to matter. Although Osama
bin Laden is a Saudi by birth, his most
active followers are Egyptians, shaped by
Western technology and Qutbist Islamism to become weapons
in the fight to the death against technology. Al-Qa‘eda offers
them a new way of life which is also a way of death—an Islamist
equivalent of the “being-towards-death” extolled by Heidegger,
in which all external loyalties are dissolved in an act of self-sacrificial commitment.
Al-Qa‘eda appeals to North African Muslims partly because
it is an Arabist organization, expressing itself in the language
and imagery of the Koran and pursuing a conflict that has its
roots in the land of the Prophet. It has given to the Sunni and
Arab branch of Islamism the same sense of identity that the
Shi‘ite and Persian branch received from the Islamic Republic
of Ayatollah Khomeini. Indeed, its vision is virtually indistinguishable from that of Khomeini, who once described the
killing of Western corrupters as a “surgical operation” commanded by God himself.
Khomeini’s sentiments do not
merely reflect his reading of the
Koran. They are the fruit of a long
exile in the West, where he was
protected by the infidels whose
destruction he conjures. They are
a vivid testimony to the fact that
the virtues of Western political
systems are, to a certain kind of
Islamic mind, imperceptible—or
perceptible, as they were to Qutb and Atta, only as hideous
moral failings. Even while enjoying the peace and freedom
that issue from a secular rule of law, a person who regards
the shari‘a as the unique path to salvation may see these
things only as the signs of a spiritual emptiness or corruption. For someone like Khomeini—a figure of great historic
importance—human rights and secular government display
the decadence of Western civilization, which has failed to arm
itself against those who intend to destroy it. The message is
that there can be no compromise, and systems that make compromise and conciliation into their ruling principles are merely
aspects of the Devil’s work.
Islam originally spread through the world on the wings of

“Islam was therefore the
answer to the rootlessness and comfortlessness
of modernity,”

“Muslims, who believe on the
authority of the Koran that suicide is categorically forbidden,
have nevertheless been sucked
into the shi’ite maelstrom.”
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military success. Conquest, victory, and triumph over enemies
are a continual refrain of the Koran, offered as proof that God
is on the side of the believers. The Shi‘ites are remarkable
among Muslims, however, in commemorating, as the central
episode in their cult, a military defeat. To some extent they
share the Christian vision of divinity as proved not through
worldly triumph but through the willing acceptance of failure.
Like Christians, Shi‘ites take comfort in an eschatology of
redemption, looking forward to the return of the Hidden Imam
in the way that many Christians anticipate the Second Coming
of Christ.
Hussein Ibn ‘Ali, whom the Shi‘ites recognize as their third
Imam, was killed, together with his followers, by the armies
of the Umayyad Caliph Yazid at the battle of Karbala in 680.
Hussein was, for his followers, a symbol of all that is pure,
innocent, and good in the Islamic way of life, and Yazid a proof
that the community formed by the Prophet had fallen into the
hands of corrupt and evil usurpers. By each year lamenting
the defeat of Hussein, in rituals that may extend to excesses
of self-inflicted injury, the Shi‘ites rehearse their conviction
that Islam must be constantly returned to its original purity,
and that the powers that prevail in the world will always seek
to corrupt it. At the same time Shi‘ites
internalize the goal of self-sacrificial
death as the final proof of merit. This
last feature became immensely important in the war against Iraq, which
succeeded the Islamic Revolution in
Iran. Following in the tradition of the
assassins, Khomeini issued a new call
to martyrdom, which was taken up by
children and teenagers who expended
their lives in clearing minefields.
The example set by the followers of Khomeini was soon projected around the world. Sunni Muslims, who believe on the
authority of the Koran that suicide is categorically forbidden,
have nevertheless been sucked into the Shi‘ite maelstrom to
become martyrs in the war against Satan. The cult of death
seems to make sense of a world in which evil prevails; moreover it gives unprecedented power to the martyr, who no
longer has anything to fear. The cult is both a protest against
modern nihilism and a form of it—a last-ditch attempt to rescue Islam from the abyss of nothingness by showing that it can
still demand the ultimate proof of devotion.
And the attempt seems to have succeeded. It is not too great
an exaggeration to say that this new confluence of Sunni
orthodoxy and Shi‘ite extremism has laid the foundations for a
worldwide Islamic revival. For the first time in centuries Islam
appears, both in the eyes of its followers and in the eyes of
the infidel, to be a single religious movement united around a
single goal. Nor is it an exaggeration to suggest that one major
factor in producing this unwonted unity is Western civilization
and the process of globalization which it has set in motion. In
the days when East was East and West was West it was possible
for Muslims to devote their lives to pious observances and to
ignore the evil that prevailed in the dar al-harb. But when that
evil spreads around the globe, cheerfully offering freedoms and
permissions in place of the austere requirements of a religious
code, so that the dar al-islam is invaded by it, old antagonisms

are awakened. This is what the West now faces.
Roger Scruton is an English philosopher who has published
widely on an array of philosophical and cultural questions. This
article is adapted from his most recent book, The West and the
Rest (ISI Books, 2002) and appeared in
The Intercollegiate
Review, Fall 2002.
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Book Review: Who’s Looking Out For You?
Reviewed By Mateusz Perkowski

I

nitially, Bill O’Reilly’s new book may
give the disconcerting impression
that the notoriously prickly pundit
has turned into a softie. In the introduction, the author blatantly butters up his
readers. “If you have started this book,
the chances are you’re an independent
type,” he writes. “The everyday American
who understands what The Factor concept is all about is generally a person
who wants to live life honestly and make
his or her own way. That person is often
responsible, generous, aware that others
around them also have lives to live, and
unabashedly patriotic. You, very likely,
are one of those people.”
After this prudish flattery, O’Reilly
boasts about the incredibly high ratings
of his show. The sheer momentum of
its popularity overcame the elite media
“eggheads” who were plotting the program’s demise – “The American people
had made the O’Reilly Factor a powerful entity,” the author writes, and then
brags about the acclaim he has received
from the American Television Critics
Association and Industry Magazine
Television Week.
After fawning over himself and his
minions of fans, O’Reilly decides to
enlighten the masses with pieces of wis-
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dom gathered during the course of his
life. Some are remarkably perceptive.
A great many, however, are profoundly
redundant: “You must learn to become
a problem solver, not a problem creator.” Worn out pieces of advice – such
as the importance of “defining your
life, and not letting others define it for
you” – may lead the reader to think
the book is just another run-of-the-mill
self-help guide with a political twist.
Luckily, O’Reilly’s pointed wit outshines
the book’s numerous clichés.
And don’t worry – you won’t find
Who’s Looking Out For You? in the
‘personal growth’ section of the book
store. Even the most tired platitudes
are interpreted with an original, levelheaded abrasiveness that only O’Reilly
can provide. Unlike the legions of ‘psychobabble’ gurus, O’Reilly admits that it
is impossible to entirely clear your life of
problems. Especially if they are serious.
“If you’re going to drink a quart of bourbon a day or smoke crack, this book is
not going to help you,” writes O’Reilly.
Even those of us who aren’t drug
addicts are also faced with constant
hurdles. However, the author doesn’t
think we must hide from these difficulties. They are to be expected.
“Problems are the reason humans are
at the top of the food chain…Our ancestors, the primates, lived a marginal existence until a giant animal ate them.
Then we evolved and learned to stick a
fiery torch in the giant animal’s face.”
The problems confronting the human
species are currently much more complex than killing predatory animals, but
the basic logic remains the same: we
must use our intellect to ensure survival.
Rationality must allow us to understand
the forces working in our favor, as well
as the forces working against us – this is
the guiding principle in Who’s Looking
Out For You? The ultimate skill, O’Reilly
says, is “the ability to determine who

cares about you as a person and who
doesn’t.”
The book includes anecdotes of the
author’s own achievements and humiliations, both as working-class kid, an
investigative reporter, and a news
anchorman. While the title of the book
may be Who’s Looking Out For You?,
the author concentrates mostly on
whom you cannot trust. (Just about
everybody.) O’Reilly mentions some of
his own private betrayals, but is discreet
enough not to “name names,” as he usually does about public figures.
In the most personally revealing portion of the book, however, he goes into
detail about the unstable relationship he
had with his father: an accountant who
despised his dreary dead-end career, but
kept the position of out of insecurity. He
often took his frustrations out upon his
son both physically and mentally; the
two men had a very tense relationship.
Upon his deathbed, the elder O’Reilly
lamented the unfulfilled potential of
his life. Instead of vilifying his father in
Who’s Looking Out For You, the author
say he learned from the man’s regrets.
Unlike his father, Bill O’Reilly pursued
his goals fearlessly, and, as he admits,
somewhat brashly.
O’Reilly also concedes that his achievements as a journalist and broadcaster
were not founded only upon his talent
and mental agility, but on his capacity to find worthwhile companions. The
author offers advice on how to earn and
retain valuable friends, how to avoid
“weasels,” and even offers a few tidbits
of advice about romantic relationships.
The new book generally has a more personal tone than the The No Spin Zone
or The O’Reilly Factor, and it is clear
that the author wanted to create something different from his previous works.
Essentially, though, Whose Looking Out
For You? is a continuation of O’Reilly’s
ongoing analysis of the American politi-
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cal and social system.
This isn’t a bad thing. Whether it is on
the radio, on television, or in print, Bill
O’Reilly is always doing the same thing:
cutting through the layers of political correctness and media hyperbole in order
to get a glimpse of reality. His scrutiny
is often unrefined and conservatively
slanted, but the man honestly wants to
get to the bottom of things. Unlike many
other broadcasters,
O’Reilly is more than just a mouthpiece
for the Republican party. Many accuse
him of being an unsophisticated boor
– but this lack of nuance doesn’t mean
he is devoid of insight. “Occasionally
the Irish do know what they’re talking
about,” writes O’Reilly, poking fun at
himself. “Just don’t get them at closing
time.”
As we have come to expect, O’Reilly is
generous with biting commentary about
the government, the media, and all the
other ‘usual suspects.’ Though he deals
with problems both great and small,
his writing isn’t choppy – the author
seamlessly segues from the troubles of
individual people to the burdens of the
country as a whole. More often than
not, the two are interrelated; as in the
case of the sycophantic government and
the decadent consumerism of American
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culture.
According to O’Reilly, the government
creates the illusion of ‘looking out for
you’ through social programs. But this
superficial compassion amounts to little
more than throwing money at stagnant
bureaucracies. According to O’Reilly, the
system is no longer working effectively;
“our federal government is not good at
helping real people who have real problems, and it doesn’t care about the money
you give it, as long as that revenue train
keeps chugging along.”
The gradual creation of a powerful government opposes the basic philosophy of
the United States, which ensures freedom
from overly central control. According to
the author, “corruption, incompetence
and political correctness have spread
like the Ebola virus throughout our federal system.” The government ‘for the
people, by the people’ has become a
bureaucracy designed to pander to the
interests of lobbyists and campaign contributors. This image of government-forsale has a subversive effect on traditionally American concepts like self-reliance
and independence. O’Reilly recalls the
old American spirit, which Theodore
Roosevelt embodied in a single sentence:
“Pray not for lighter burdens, but for
stronger backs.” Unfortunately, this spir-

it is gradually eroding; in O’Reilly’s view,
the underlying problem in the United
States is an obsession with consumption
and gratification – “an intense quest for
self-satisfaction.”
As if scolding the American public
weren’t enough, the author acknowledges President George W. Bush is a “child
of privilege” who “brings a sense of entitlement to his job.” Unless it involves
his fans, O’Reilly is obviously terrible
at kissing butt. The criticism is spread
all around. Aside from the obvious targets, such as President Clinton and dishonest corporate executives, the author
also reproves such conservative-friendly
characters as John Ashcroft and Pope
John Paul II for their failures in leadership. His blunt words may not land him
any invitations to White House dinners,
but Bill O’Reilly’s observations are rarely
off-mark.
The author’s characteristically selfconscious arrogance pervades Whose
Looking Out For You? This may put off
many people, but it will probably charm
just as many. Bill O’Reilly hasn’t made a
name for himself for being humble, but
he does not presume to be omniscient.
“Sometimes I’m wrong,” he writes,
“Sometimes, I even admit it.” The book
isn’t a piece of timeless literature, not
does it purport to be – nonetheless, the
personable common sense offered in its
pages is well-written and presented in
an entertaining context. Whose Looking
Out For You? may never define American
culture or steer the future of foreign policy, but it does one thing remarkably well:
it manages to combine easy readability
with honest, intellectual analysis.
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“His message is that Bush
is out of control.”
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